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CONSONANCE OR RIVALRY?
CALIBRATING THE EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE




It is not surprising that many perpetrators of international hu-
manitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda
have been detained in the countries directly involved in the hostili-
ties, and that they are now facing criminal trials there.1  Nor is it un-
precedented that a large number of culprits were subsequently forced
to flee or eventually, as became the case particularly in Rwanda, were
victimized themselves by the atrocities and therefore became refu-
gees in third countries.2  To the extent that they are now recognized
and identified as war criminals in these countries, criminal legal pro-
ceedings may be instituted against them under the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the host countries.
A very distinctive feature of the criminal legal process against
the perpetrators of humanitarian law violations in the former Yugo-
slavia and in Rwanda is that for the first time in recent history an in-
ternational criminal jurisdiction over individuals, which exists con-
*
 Senior Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  The views expressed in
this Comment are solely those of the author and are not to be taken as representing those of
the United Nations.
1. As of December 1996, it is estimated that the Rwandan government has approximately
88,000 potential suspects in custody in connection with Hutu violence against the Tutsi minority
which occurred in Rwanda in 1994.  See Elizabeth Neuffer, Amid Tribal Struggles, Crimes Go
Unpunished; War Tribunal Stalls Over Mass Killings, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1996, at A1.
2. Many of the Hutu leaders and members of the Rwandan army took shelter in refugee
camps located in neighboring Zaire in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda and following the
establishment of a Tutsi-led government:
[T]hese camps were controlled by the same Hutu extremists who had carried out the
genocide.  Indeed most of the architects, planners and implementers of the mass mur-
der not only found havens in these ‘cities’ but actually retained their positions of
authority.  Even worse, they escaped together with the fully-armed former Rwandan
army which had played an active role in the murders.
Efraim Zuroff, Let’s Act Now, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 25, 1996, at 6.
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currently with the jurisdiction of national courts, has been estab-
lished.3  This represents a landmark in the development of interna-
tional law.
Concurrent criminal jurisdiction implies that authorities of two
legal systems have the legal capacity to investigate, prosecute, and
convict the same person for the same criminal acts under their re-
spective, separate jurisdictions.4  This frequently occurs between two
states, each of which claims the right to convict the same person un-
der its domestic jurisdiction.5  Such cases are normally resolved by re-
sorting to provisions on universal jurisdiction6 or extradition7 in the
domestic laws of each country.  Concurrent jurisdiction may also
arise between states and an international tribunal, such as the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Tribunal), as each is legally
entitled to prosecute individual persons for certain criminal acts.8  In
the case of the Tribunal, however, the situation is slightly different
both in that states have in many cases not adopted the necessary leg-
islation allowing for prosecution of war crimes and extradition to the
Tribunal,9 and also because the Tribunal has ultimate primacy over
the national courts.10  The problems relating to concurrent jurisdic-
tion between states and the Tribunal, therefore, assume a unique
character.11
3. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 1598, 1605 (1994) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute].
4. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 317-18 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the flag state and the territorial state over
vessels in ports or territorial waters of the latter).
5. See id.
6. Universal jurisdiction has been defined as “a principle allowing jurisdiction over acts
of non-nationals where the circumstances, including the nature of the crime, justify the repres-
sion of some types of crime as a matter of international public policy.”  Id. at 304.
7. Extradition has been defined as follows:
[S]tates have to depend on the co-operation of the other states in order to obtain sur-
render of suspected criminals or convicted criminals who are, or have fled, abroad.
Where this co-operation rests on a procedure of request and consent, regulated by
certain general principles, the form of international judicial assistance is called extra-
dition. . . .  With the exception of alleged crimes under international law [i.e., war
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace], in the absence of a treaty,
surrender of an alleged criminal cannot be demanded as of right.
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
8. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1605.
9. Among Rwanda’s African neighbors, only Cameroon and Zambia have enacted legis-
lation to facilitate cooperation with the Tribunal.  See Iain Guest, Makings of Disaster, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at A29.
10. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1605.
11. In the present context, concurrent jurisdiction will be discussed in the latter sense, that
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Concurrent jurisdiction carries both benefits and drawbacks for
the parties involved.  On the positive side, concurrent jurisdiction
may allow for a thrifty and cost-saving coordination of prosecution
resources between states and the international organization, neither
of which can afford high expenses for this purpose.  If investigations
can be coordinated and evidence collected and shared between the
national and international prosecutors, for instance, considerable
time and resources can be saved.  Concurrent jurisdiction, further-
more, may relieve states of the risk of prejudice in the trials of very
high-profile perpetrators.  From the victims’ point of view, concur-
rent jurisdiction may establish a basis for a joint legal and financial
framework to provide compensation for suffering and damages which
would most likely prove more accessible to the victims than a divided
national and international program.
On the negative side, concurrent jurisdiction almost inevitably
involves considerable uncertainty as to the division of responsibilities
for investigation and prosecution by each of the competent parties.
This uncertainty may eventually lead to extensive rivalry between the
parties if both seek to garner the credit for prosecuting the same per-
petrators.  More importantly, however, concurrent jurisdiction may
obstruct national catharsis by frustrating popular expectations in the
victim’s country that justice will be done under domestic law to those
most responsible.  Whatever the case, the endeavour to avoid the
negative side-effects of concurrent jurisdiction between the national
authorities and the Tribunal would seem to require the continuous
maintenance of close cooperation, careful coordination, and open
links of communication between the parties.
This Comment explores some of the legal and practical implica-
tions of concurrent jurisdiction, notably from the perspective of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  Section II expounds
briefly on the applicable principles and provisions governing the Tri-
bunal’s international jurisdiction vis-à-vis the domestic jurisdictions
of Rwanda and other states.  Section III looks separately at a number
of particular legal problems inherent in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for Rwanda12 and the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,13 and Sections IV
                                                                                                                                     
is, between states and the Tribunal.
12. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3.
13. International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Geno-
cide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/3/Rev.9 (1996) (latest revi-
sion cited herein not publicly available) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative &
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and V conclude by offering an analysis of the Tribunal’s practice and
suggesting a new approach to concurrent jurisdiction.
II. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION AND
COOPERATION
Three general principles govern the relations between national
authority and the Tribunal: primacy of the Tribunal over national
courts; non bis in idem;14 and cooperation and judicial assistance be-
tween states and the Tribunal.  The first principle is embodied in Ar-
ticle 8 of the Tribunal Statute, which creates concurrent jurisdiction
between national courts and the Tribunal15 and then establishes the
Tribunal’s supremacy over national courts.16  Under this provision,
the Tribunal may request national courts to defer to the competence
of the Tribunal at any stage in their procedures.17  If a criminal case
over which the Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction has been initiated
before a national court, the Tribunal may assume control of the
hearings and convict the accused, thereby superseding the national
court’s jurisdiction.
The second principle, non bis in idem, provides that no person
shall be tried before a national court for violations of international
humanitarian law for which he or she has already been tried by the
Tribunal.18  The Tribunal may, however, try a case against a person
already convicted by a national court, but only under certain condi-
tions:  If the national court had characterized the crime as an ordi-
nary crime,19 if the national court proceedings were not impartial or
independent,20 if the hearings were designed to shield the accused
                                                                                                                                     
International Law) (Cited Rules reproduced in Appendix attached to this Comment)
[hereinafter Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
14. Non bis in idem is defined as “[n]ot twice for the same; that is, a man shall not be twice
tried for the same crime.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (4th ed. 1968).
15. “The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the
territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”  Tribunal
Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1605.
16. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1605.
17. See id.
18. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1605; see also Tribunal Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 13.
19. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(a), 33 I.L.M. at 1605; see also Tribunal
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 9(i).
20. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(b), 33 I.L.M. at 1605; see also Tribunal
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 9(ii).
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from international criminal responsibility,21 or if the case was not dili-
gently prosecuted.22
The third principle, established by Article 28 of the Tribunal
Statute, obliges states to cooperate with the Tribunal in its investiga-
tion and prosecution of persons falling within the Tribunal’s compe-
tence,23 and to comply swiftly with orders and requests issued by the
Tribunal’s Chambers.24  States are bound to carry out any orders or
requests made by the Tribunal’s Chambers for, inter alia, identifying
and locating suspects, taking testimonies and producing evidence, ef-
fecting the service of documents, arresting or detaining suspected
persons, and transferring accused persons to the Tribunal.25  The ob-
ligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and to offer judicial assistance
is further implemented in Rules 11, 13, 40, 55, 58, 59, 60 and 61 of the
Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence.26
These standards, however, are not merely a set of guiding princi-
ples.  The Tribunal Statute was adopted by the U.N. Security Council
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,27 which implies that any legal
obligations in the provisions of the Tribunal Statute, as well as any
orders issued by the Tribunal in accordance with the Tribunal Statute
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, are directly binding on
states under international law.28  In the case of a state’s violation or
disregard of a request for deferral or an order for execution of a war-
rant issued by the Tribunal, the President of the Tribunal may bring
the matter before the Security Council and allege that the state has
violated its international legal obligations under the U.N. Charter.29
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 28(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1612.
24. See id., art. 28(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1612.
25. See id.
26. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rules 11, 13, 40, 55, 58,
59, 60, 61.
27. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1601 (1994).
28. See U.N. CHARTER art. 48 (stating that the action required to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken
by all Members of the United Nations); id. art. 49 (stating that U.N. members must offer mu-
tual assistance to carry out measures decided upon by the Security Council).
29. See, e.g., Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rules 11, 13, 59,
61.
HARHOFF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
576 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:571
III. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION:
THE CHAMBERS AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
The decisions, orders, and requests issued by the Tribunal’s
Chambers in accordance with its Statute and its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence provide a substantial basis for cooperation with na-
tional judicial and executive authorities.  Yet the Chambers are only
rarely engaged in direct contact with these state authorities.  Contact
may occur if a Chamber or a judge decides to sit in another country
to execute the functions of the Tribunal.30  Otherwise, under Article
28 of the Tribunal Statute, the decisions, orders and requests issued
by the Chambers or a judge normally assume the character of legally-
binding instructions to national authorities.31
A. Rule 40 bis32
Interesting legal questions may arise, however, as to the limits of
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in issuing legally-binding instructions to
national authorities.  Under Rule 40 bis, a judge may order the trans-
fer of a suspect, who is held in custody abroad, from the host country
to the Tribunal’s detention facilities in Arusha,33 and also order the
provisional detention of the suspect for up to 90 days.34  Rule 40 bis
applies in cases where the Prosecutor has already requested a state to
arrest a suspect provisionally under Rule 40, or where a suspect has
otherwise been detained by that state.35
The question then arises whether Rule 40 bis is to be interpreted
to imply that a Tribunal judge can order and extend the provisional
detention of the suspect while in foreign custody, or whether the
power to do so only arises once the suspect has been transferred to
the Tribunal’s detention facilities in Arusha.  One possible interpre-
tation is to hold that the Tribunal is incompetent under international
law to order the detention of a suspect held in custody under foreign
national law; thus, an order to that effect constitutes an unwarranted
30. See id. Rule 4.  One example of the use of the Rule 4 arrangement, observed by the
author, occurred when a Tribunal judge twice extended the provisional detention of four
suspects under investigation by the Tribunal by acting in the capital of a foreign country where
the suspects were detained.  On one of these occasions, a courtroom was provided in the court
building by the government of the host country.
31. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 28, 33 I.L.M. at 1612.  See supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
32. Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13. Rule 40 bis.
33. See id. para. A.
34. See id. para. H.
35. See id. para. B(i).
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intrusion into the sovereignty of the host country.  Although the
Prosecutor may request a state to arrest a suspect under Rule 40, a
request to this effect is clearly limited to the immediate arrest of the
suspect and does not cover the subsequent detention in domestic cus-
tody, which is a matter of national concern.36  According to this inter-
pretation, a Tribunal judge can order the detention of the suspect
only after transfer to Arusha, which is why Rule 40 bis is worded to
read “transfer and detention,” in that order.37
Another possible interpretation, however, would be to contend
that Rule 40 bis was adopted expressly for the purpose of providing
the Tribunal with the power to regulate the detention of a suspect in
foreign custody,38 and that Rule 40 bis therefore should be inter-
preted so as to govern the “detention and transfer” of that suspect.
Although this problem may seem to have far-reaching implications, it
should not be overestimated.  Paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Tribu-
nal Statute, in essence, obliges states to comply with requests or or-
ders issued by a Chamber,39 and an order for provisional detention
(or extension thereof) of a suspect in foreign custody automatically
assumes the character of a directly applicable and presumably legally
binding instrument under international law.  Given the purpose of
Article 28 of the Tribunal Statute,40 it would seem reasonable to as-
sume that the power to order a state to arrest a suspect, and notably
to keep him detained until he can be transferred to the Tribunal, does
fall within the competence of the Tribunal.  Otherwise, the state
might have to release the suspect after a short time for lack of suffi-
cient evidence to sustain the charges against him.  Orders under Rule
40 bis issued not by a Chamber but by a single judge should be
viewed as valid and binding upon states, since there is nothing to sug-
gest that states should not be obliged by Article 28, paragraphs (d)41
36. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 40(A).
37. See id. Rule 40 bis(A) (emphasis added).
38. The author observes that Rule 40 bis was adopted as a reaction to the objection by one
host country that a mere request by the Prosecutor for the arrest of a suspect (under Rule 40)
was insufficient as a legal basis for detention, since a request to this effect would have to be
issued by a court proper and not just by the Prosecutor.
39. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 28(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1612; see supra notes 23-25
and accompanying text.
40. Per its own language, the purpose of Article 28 is to ensure that states cooperate with
the investigations and prosecutions of the Tribunal and comply with any requests or orders is-
sued by the Chambers.  See id.
41. “States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order
issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to . . . (d) The arrest or detention of per-
sons . . . .”  Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 28(d), 33 I.L.M. at 1612.
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and (e)42 of the Statute to comply with arrest warrants and orders for
the surrender of persons indicted by the Tribunal, even if these are
rendered only by a single judge.43  Orders and decisions, therefore,
have the same legal force whether they are issued by a single judge or
a Chamber.
B. Communication
Another problem relates to the level of communication between
the Tribunal and national authorities.  Convictions in absentia are
prohibited under Article 20 of the Tribunal Statute,44 but parallel and
simultaneous indictments might be issued inadvertently by the attor-
ney general of a state and the Tribunal’s Prosecutor.  It would there-
fore be desirable to oblige national courts to notify the Tribunal
whenever a case is being brought against a perpetrator for crimes
committed within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but no such provision is
found in the Tribunal Statute.45  In practice thus far, most countries
have willingly notified both the Tribunal and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of domestic criminal
cases against potential Tribunal suspects.46  However, as more trials
are expected to begin in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the
near future, a proper system of prior notification should be imple-
mented.47
42. “States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order
issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to . . . (e) The surrender or the transfer of
the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”  Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art.
28(e), 33 I.L.M. at 1612.
43. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 55(A)-(B).
44. “In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Stat-
ute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: . . . (d)
to be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal
assistance of his or her own choosing . . . .” Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(4), 33 I.L.M.
at 1610.
45. National courts are prevented from convicting a person who has already been tried by
the Tribunal.  See Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1605; see also Tribunal
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 8 (allowing the Tribunal’s Prosecutor to
request information about investigations or criminal proceedings from national authorities).
46. In the one case so far in which a person has been tried and convicted in a third country
not involved in the hostilities for crimes falling under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the case in
which Refic Saric was sentenced to eight years imprisonment by the Supreme Court of
Denmark, the Tribunal was first asked if it wished to assume the case.  The Tribunal declined,
but sent an observer to follow the trial in Copenhagen.  See Bosnischer Muslim Beteuert Seine
Unschuld,  SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 12, 1995, at 6.
47. For communication of information on ongoing investigations, see infra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
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C. Deferral to the Competence of the Tribunal
A related aspect of concurrent jurisdiction is that of obliging na-
tional courts to defer to the competence of the Tribunal.  According
to Rule 9 of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the
Prosecutor may invite a Chamber to issue a formal request that a na-
tional court defer to the competence of the Tribunal whenever the
Prosecutor finds that an act subject to national investigation or crimi-
nal proceedings in a national court is characterized as an ordinary
crime or is not diligently prosecuted, or if such proceedings are con-
ducted with a lack of impartiality, or if the issue otherwise has severe
ramifications for the Tribunal.48  The practical implications of this
type of a request, however, appear somewhat uncertain.  As indicated
above, states are not obligated to notify the Tribunal of ongoing tri-
als,49 let alone ongoing investigations, and chances are that the Prose-
cutor will have little opportunity to supervise the conduct of national
investigations and trials.  Even if the Prosecutor did become aware of
any such parallel actions, the only recourse available would be for the
Tribunal to make a formal request for deferral according to Rule 10
of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence and thus to take
over the case.50  This outcome, however, is unlikely given the Tribu-
nal’s lack of resources.  The best option for both the Tribunal and na-
tional courts in this kind of situation is to insist on closer cooperation
between the Tribunal and the national prosecution as early as possi-
ble, including the exchange of evidence and coordination of the in-
vestigation.
D. Orders for Arrest and Surrender of Accused Persons
Both the Tribunal’s primacy over national courts and the binding
international legal character of the Tribunal Statute confer a strong
obligation on states to cooperate with the Tribunal regarding the ar-
rest and surrender of accused persons.  Rule 56 of the Tribunal Rules
of Procedure and Evidence requires swift action by states to ensure
that indicted persons are arrested as soon as an arrest warrant has
been served on the host state.51  Rule 58 then highlights the Tribunal’s
primacy over all legal impediments, found under national law or ex-
tradition treaties of states, to the immediate surrender of the accused
48. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 9.
49. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
50. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 10.
51. Id. Rule 56.
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to the Tribunal after an arrest has been made.52  This provision effec-
tively sets aside national legislation on extradition to the extent that
such legislation hampers the immediate surrender of the accused to
the Tribunal, and fills lacunae in national legislation in order to per-
mit the surrender if there is no enactment to this effect.53  To clarify
the Tribunal’s supremacy over national authorities, Rule 59 estab-
lishes that failure to execute an arrest warrant within a reasonable
time period may result in a prompt report of the matter to the U.N.
Security Council.54  These provisions appear dramatically interven-
tionist, making it more appropriate to characterize this part of the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction not as concurrent with, but superior to, the na-
tional jurisdiction of states.  These provisions also reflect the need to
avoid situations where states would either refuse to arrest persons ac-
cused by the Tribunal or eventually refuse to surrender such persons
after their arrest.
In practice, however, the Tribunal’s approach has been less con-
frontational.  States which were willing to surrender the accused to
the Tribunal have been given sufficient time to prepare and imple-
ment the necessary legislation for transfer of the accused.55  The Tri-
bunal has restricted itself to exerting various degrees of political
pressure even when states have been reluctant to comply immedi-
ately with arrest warrants.56  The Tribunal was not ready to receive
any of the accused until the detention facilities in Arusha were ready,
which occurred only recently.57
In cases where states have refused to cooperate in the arrest or
surrender of an accused person, the Tribunal’s strategy thus far has
been to exert pressure by diplomatic means.58  Reporting to the Secu-
52. Id. Rule 58.
53. See id.
54. Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 59.
55. For example, the Tribunal waited until after the Belgian legislature passed the neces-
sary extradition legislation before formally indicting three suspects who had been arrested in
Belgium.  See James C. McKinley, Jr., Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Indicts 2 Men in Jail in
Zambia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at A9.
56. Cameroon, which had in place legislation compelling cooperation with the Tribunal’s
prosecution, still refused to extradite Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and three other Rwandans
who had been indicted by the Tribunal and only surrendered the suspects to the Tribunal in
January of 1997, nearly one year after the suspects were brought into custody.  See U.N.
Rwanda Genocide Tribunal Receives Key Accused, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Jan. 24, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File.
57. The first cells in the detention facilities in Arusha were not ready until May 26, 1996.
58. See discussion supra note 56.
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rity Council is an available option,59 and the Tribunal has reiterated
to recalcitrant states that it eventually will resort to this remedy,
which carries dramatic political implications, should the situation re-
main unchanged.60  There can be no doubt whatsoever that this cau-
tion is to be taken literally and seriously; non-compliance is not and
cannot be an option.
E. Sanctions and the Serving of Sentences
Concurrent jurisdiction also covers sanctions and the serving of
sentences.  Rule 101(A) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence excludes the death penalty and limits the Tribunal’s sentencing
options to prison terms, up to life imprisonment.61  Rule 101(B)(iii)
explicitly instructs the Tribunal Chambers to take into account the
general sentencing practices of Rwandan courts when determining a
Tribunal sentence.62  Harmonizing Tribunal sentences with the level
of Rwandan practice is a shrewd way of calibrating the concurrent ju-
risdictions of Rwanda and the Tribunal without committing the Tri-
bunal to adhering to the practices of other countries where war
crimes are being tried.
A related issue is the identification of the place where sentences
can be served.  Rule 103 provides that imprisonment shall be served
in Rwanda or in a state designated by the Tribunal from a list of
states which have notified the Tribunal of their willingness to receive
convicted persons.63  A literal interpretation of this provision indi-
cates that sentences are to be served in Rwanda unless there are par-
ticular reasons to transfer the convicted persons to prisons elsewhere,
and unless other countries have volunteered to receive them and
have made the necessary preparations, such as providing prison cells
which meet international criteria.  One can only speculate about the
reasons which eventually may motivate the Tribunal’s transfer of a
convict to a foreign country other than Rwanda.  These reasons,
which differ from case to case, may include fear of reprisals against
the convicted person, lack of security, and lack of adequate detention
facilities.  It is crucial that other states volunteer to receive persons
convicted by the Tribunal.  This practice will make it possible for the
Tribunal to assess the risks and needs of each case and provide sup-
59. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 59(B).
60. These comments are based on the author’s personal observations.
61. Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 101(A).
62. Id. Rule 101(B)(iii).
63. Id. Rule 103(A).
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port for and relief to Rwanda which otherwise would hold sole re-
sponsibility for accommodating the Tribunal’s lifetime prisoners.  As
the prison facilities are to be accepted and supervised by the Tribunal
or another international institution designated by the Tribunal,64 e.g.,
the International Committee for the Red Cross, there should be little
chance of significantly different standards for prison cells, whether
located inside or outside Rwanda.
It would be preferable to have states on the African continent
receive at least some of the prisoners, partly to provide a practical
example that justice is done and enforced in Africa.  Utilizing prison
facilities in Africa will also ensure that the prisoners are located
where physical contact with their families is still possible, and where
the prison conditions, in terms of religion, culture, climate, and lan-
guage, are not overly foreign.  The choice of a host country may vary
from prisoner to prisoner.
F. Restitution of Property and Compensation to Victims
Article 23 of the Tribunal Statute,65 supplemented by Rules
88(B), 105, and 10666 of the Tribunal Rules of Evidence and Proce-
dure, explicitly provides for restitution and compensation, which in-
evitably will entail substantial practical and legal cooperation be-
tween the Tribunal and Rwanda.  Perpetrators who have illegally
taken alien property may be forced to return such property to its
rightful owners upon identification by the relevant national authori-
ties.67  Given that Rwandan courts and executive authorities will be
entangled in the process of settling civil property claims in the wake
of the return of refugees,68 it would seem appropriate for the Tribunal
to coordinate its judgments on property restitution with the Rwandan
authorities.
The same rationale applies to the question of victim compensa-
64. Id. Rule 104 (providing that the Tribunal or body acting upon its authority will oversee
all prison sentences).
65. “In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any prop-
erty and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful
owners.” Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 23(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1611.
66. Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rules 88(B), 105, 106.
67. See Id. Rule 105.
68. See Stephen Buckley, Rwandans Crowd Road From Tanzania; U.N. Puts Count of
Day’s Returnees, Mostly Hutus, at 22,000, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1996, at A20 (stating that
“Thousands of Rwandans have returned over the last month to find their houses and land oc-
cupied, a problem likely to be exacerbated by the continuing flow of refugees from Tanza-
nia.”).
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tion.  The Tribunal shall notify states if it finds the accused guilty of
crimes which have caused injury to victims,69 a finding which allows
the victims to claim compensation through judicial procedures or
public institutions.70  If the Tribunal renders judgments to this effect,
prior arrangements will have to be made with the states in question
to ensure that sufficient procedures and funds are available.
G. Amicus Curiae
Another way of handling the practicalities of concurrent jurisdic-
tion between Rwanda and the Tribunal is to allow the Rwandan
Government to appear directly before the Tribunal and voice its legal
concerns and factual observations.  This may be done by having the
Rwandan government appear as amicus curiae before the Tribunal.71
IV. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION:
THE PROSECUTOR AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES72
The fundamental issue relating to concurrent jurisdiction is how
to divide investigation and prosecution between the two parties in
order to avoid overlap, inaccessibility of evidence and rivalry.  Until
recently, the Tribunal operations were relatively independent of the
Rwandan Government’s investigation of perpetrators in Rwanda.
Given its mandate and the limited resources available to the Tribu-
nal, however, together with constraints imposed by the security situa-
tion in Rwanda, the Tribunal, over time, adopted a strategy of inves-
tigation and prosecution which was aimed at the political and military
leadership down to the level of regional authorities.73 Although this
strategy was at times strongly affected by the arrest of a number of
suspects in various third states, it has remained largely unchanged.
This strategy, however, was never properly coordinated with the
Rwandan authorities in the sense that no arrangement was made to
divide the suspects between the two concurrent jurisdictions, primar-
ily because the Tribunal wished to retain full and unlimited inde-
69. See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 13, Rule 106(A).
70. See id. para. B.
71. Rwanda can invoke Rule 74 of the Tribunal Rules of Procedures and Evidence to ap-
pear as amicus curiae before the Tribunal.  See Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, su-
pra note 13, Rule 74.
72. The following section draws upon the author’s own experiences.
73. Except for witnesses who may wish to plead guilty before the Tribunal of having com-
mitted crimes for which they have accounted during their testimonies, the Prosecutor is likely
to abstain from indicting any public civil servant below the level of bourgemeisters.
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pendence. In addition, no framework seemed available to the Tribu-
nal for practical coordination with the Rwandan Government on ex-
actly how and to what extent this issue could be negotiated and how a
division of responsibilities could be implemented in practice.
It might have been desirable to have a strategy or policy for lim-
iting the Tribunal’s investigation and prosecution in order to allow
for concurrent Rwandan jurisdiction.  In my opinion, however, it
would have been extremely difficult to adopt any policy on how to
share the evidence and divide the suspects between the two parties.
The differences between the two establishments in terms of means
and methods of investigation, access to witnesses and evidence, po-
litical constraints, and cultural and linguistic barriers, together with
the accidental and totally unpredictable nature of arrests made in
third States, would frustrate any effort to work out a viable strategy
for dividing the targets.  In addition, a strategy to this effect would
endure only so long as both parties had a true common interest in the
exercise.  Both parties are probably aware of the possibility that this
might not always be the case, which may further explain why a com-
mon strategy was never adopted.
The frustration felt in Rwanda with the fear that the Tribunal
would always intervene and effectively bar the Rwandan prosecution
from ever bringing any of the former leaders of the genocide cam-
paign to trial in Rwanda is perfectly understandable, as is the frustra-
tion with the fact that the most responsible perpetrators will receive
life sentences from the Tribunal, while less culpable culprits may face
the death penalty under Rwandan law.  One might first question
whether the death penalty is really a harsher sentence than life im-
prisonment; some may argue convincingly to the opposite.  One must
always recognize that the Tribunal was established not only to restore
peace and justice in Rwanda, but also to maintain international peace
and security as a new institution which could pave the way for the
prevention of such atrocities in the future on a more general level.74
74. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, which established the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, states:
The Security Council,
. . . .
Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and
other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law
have been committed in Rwanda,
Determining that this situation continues  to constitute a threat to international peace
and security,
. . . .
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons
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Thus, on this point, the Tribunal has its own agenda.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal’s approach in handling its concurrent jurisdiction
has not been strict and consistent, and could not have been expected
to be.  Establishing and organizing a new international institution in
an area with no precedents represents a major and difficult enter-
prise.  Two approaches have prevailed in the Tribunal’s short history.
The first approach is, in my viewpoint, the more dogmatic and
formal one.  According to this approach, the Tribunal is viewed as an
independent international judicial body which neither could nor
should interfere with the Rwandan Government’s jurisdiction or the
public interest in Rwanda, and therefore should remain isolated from
any activity which could place legal or political commitments on the
Tribunal.
The other approach, as I see it, would appear to be more prag-
matic and post-modern in the sense that the Tribunal is conceived of
as an instrument which is both political and judicial in nature, estab-
lished for various purposes and without any expectations as to which
methods it should apply or which strategies it might follow. Under
this approach, the end would justify the means.
Neither of these approaches, in my viewpoint, have dominated
at any time in the Tribunal’s short history; they have both been pres-
ent all along and have influenced the decisions of the Tribunal at
various levels and at different times.  Rather than advocating one ap-
proach over the other, I support the fruitful cross-fertilization of the
two, and recommend the combination of dogmatic wisdom with in-
novation.  This synthesis forms an important part of the Tribunal’s
approach to concurrent jurisdiction.
                                                                                                                                     
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this
aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and
to the restoration and maintenance of peace,
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for genocide and the other above-mentioned violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and
effectively redressed, . . . .
S.C. Res. 955, supra note 27, at 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1601.
HARHOFF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
586 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:571
HARHOFF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
1997] CONSONANCE OR RIVALRY? 587
APPENDIX
EXCERPTS FROM RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA
RULE 4
Sittings Away from the Seat of the Tribunal
A Chamber or a Judge may exercise their functions at a place
other than the seat of the Tribunal, if so authorised by the President
in the interests of justice.
RULE 8
Request For Information
Where it appears to the Prosecutor that a crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal is or has been the subject of investigations or
criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of any State, he may re-
quest the State to forward to him all relevant information in that re-
spect, and the State shall transmit to him such information forthwith
in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.
RULE 9
Prosecutor’s Request for Deferral
Where it appears to the Prosecutor that in any such investiga-
tions or criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of any State:
(i) the act being investigated or which is the subject of those pro-
ceedings is characterised as an ordinary crime;
(ii) there is a lack of impartiality or independence, or the investiga-
tions or proceedings are designed to shield the accused from inter-
national criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently prose-
cuted; or
(iii) what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, sig-
nificant factual or legal questions which may have implications for
investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal,
the Prosecutor may propose to the Trial Chamber designated by
the President that a formal request be made that such court defer to
the competence of the Tribunal.
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RULE 10
Formal Request For Deferral
(A) If it appears to the Trial Chamber seized of a proposal for
deferral that, on any of the grounds specified in Rule 9, deferral is
appropriate, the Trial Chamber may issue a formal request to the
State concerned that its court defer to the competence of the Tribu-
nal.
(B) A request for deferral shall include a request that the results
of the investigation and a copy of the court’s records and the judge-
ment, if already delivered, be forwarded to the Tribunal.
RULE 11
Non-Compliance With a Request For Deferral
If, within sixty days after a request for deferral has been notified
by the Registrar to the State under whose jurisdiction the investiga-
tions or criminal proceedings have been instituted, the State fails to
file a response which satisfies the Trial Chamber that the State has
taken or is taking adequate steps to comply with the order, the Trial
Chamber may request the President to report the matter to the Secu-
rity Council.
RULE 13
Non Bis in Idem
When the President receives reliable information to show that
criminal proceedings have been instituted against a person before a
court of any State for acts constituting serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law under the Statute for which that person has
already been tried by the Tribunal, a Trial Chamber shall, following
mutatis mutandis the procedure provided in Rule 10, issue a reasoned
order requesting that court permanently to discontinue its proceed-
ings.  If that court fails to do so, the President may report the matter
to the Security Council.
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RULE 40
Provisional Measures
(A) In case of urgency, the Prosecutor may request any State:
(i) to arrest a suspect provisionally;
(ii) to seize physical evidence;
(iii) to take all necessary measures to prevent the escape of a sus-
pect or an accused, injury to or intimidation of a victim or witness,
or the destruction of evidence.
The State concerned shall comply forthwith, in accordance with
Article 28 of the Statute.
(B) Upon showing that a major impediment does not allow the
State to keep the suspect under provisional detention or to take all
necessary measures to prevent his escape, the Prosecutor may apply
to a Judge designated by the President for an order to transfer the
suspect to the seat of the Tribunal or to such other place as the Bu-
reau may decide, and to detain him provisionally. After consultation
with the Prosecutor and the Registrar, the transfer shall be arranged
between the State authorities concerned, the authorities of the host
Country and the Registrar.
(C) In the cases referred to in paragraph B, the suspect shall,
from the moment of his transfer, enjoy all the rights provided for in
Rule 42, and may apply for review to a Trial Chamber of the Tribu-
nal. The Chamber, after hearing the Prosecutor, shall rule upon the
application.
(D) The suspect shall be released if (i) the Chamber so rules, or
(ii) the Prosecutor fails to issue an indictment within twenty days of
the transfer.
RULE 40 bis
Transfer and Provisional Detention of Suspects
(A) In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may
transmit to the Registrar, for an order by a Judge assigned pursuant
to Rule 28, a request for the transfer to and provisional detention of a
suspect in the premises of the detention unit of the Tribunal.  This
request shall indicate the grounds upon which the request is made
and, unless the Prosecutor wishes only to question the suspect, shall
include a provisional charge and a summary of the material upon
which the Prosecutor relies.
(B) The Judge shall order the transfer and provisional detention
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of the suspect if the following conditions are met:
(i)  the Prosecutor has requested a State to arrest the suspect provi-
sionally, in accordance with Rule 40, or the suspect is otherwise de-
tained by a State;
(ii)  after hearing the Prosecutor, the Judge considers that there is a
reliable and consistent body of material which tends to show that
the suspect may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal
has jurisdiction; and
(iii)  the Judge considers provisional detention to be a necessary
measure to prevent the escape of the suspect, injury to or intimida-
tion of a victim or witness or the destruction of evidence, or to be
otherwise necessary for the conduct of the investigation.
(C) The provisional detention of a suspect may be ordered for a
period not exceeding 30 days from the day after the transfer of the
suspect to the detention unit of the Tribunal.
(D) The order for the transfer and provisional detention of the
suspect shall be signed by the Judge and bear the seal of the Tribunal.
The order shall set forth the basis of the application made by the
Prosecutor under Sub-rule (A), including the provisional charge, and
shall state the judge’s grounds for making the order, having regard to
Sub-rule (B).  The order shall also specify the initial time limit for the
provisional detention of the suspect, and be accompanied by a state-
ment of the rights of a suspect, as specified in this Rule and in Rules
42 and 43.
(E) As soon as possible, copies of the order and of the request by
the Prosecutor are served upon the suspect and his counsel by the
Registrar.
(F) At the end of the period of detention, at the Prosecutor’s re-
quest indicating the grounds upon which it is made and if warranted
by the needs of the investigation, the Judge who made the order, or
another Judge of the same Trial Chamber, may decide, subsequent to
an inter partes hearing, to extend the detention for a period not ex-
ceeding 30 days.
(G) At the end of that extension, at the Prosecutor’s request in-
dicating the grounds upon which it is made and if warranted by spe-
cial circumstances, the Judge who made the order, or another Judge
of the same Trial Chamber, may decide, subsequent to an inter partes
hearing, to extend the detention for a further period not exceeding 30
days.
(H) The total period of detention shall in no case exceed 90 days,
at the end of which, in the event the indictment has not been con-
firmed and an arrest warrant signed, the suspect shall be released or,
HARHOFF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
1997] CONSONANCE OR RIVALRY? 591
if appropriate, be delivered to the authorities of the requested State.
(I) The provisions in Rules 55(B) to 59 shall apply mutatis mu-
tandis to the execution of the order for the transfer and provisional
detention relative to a suspect.
(J) After his transfer to the seat of the Tribunal, the suspect, as-
sisted by his counsel, shall be brought, without delay, before the
Judge who made the order, or another Judge of the same Trial
Chamber, who shall ensure that his rights are respected.
(K) During detention, the Prosecutor and the suspect or his
counsel may submit to the Trial Chamber of which the Judge who
made the order is a member, all applications relative to the propriety
of provisional detention or to the suspect’s release.
(L) Without prejudice to Sub-rules (C) to (H), the Rules relating
to the detention on remand of a accused persons shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the provisional detention of persons under this Rule.
RULE 55
Evaluation of Arrest Warrants
(A) A warrant of arrest shall be signed by a Judge and shall bear
the seal of the Tribunal.  It shall be accompanied by a copy of the in-
dictment, and a statement of the rights of the accused.  These rights
include those set forth in Article 20 of the Statute, and in Rules 42
and 43 mutatis mutandis, together with the right of the accused to
remain silent, and to be cautioned that any statement he makes shall
be recorded and may be used in evidence.
(B) A warrant for the arrest of the accused and an order for his
surrender to the Tribunal shall be transmitted by the Registrar to the
national authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose ju-
risdiction or control the accused resides, or was last known to be, to-
gether with instructions that at the time of arrest the indictment and
the statement of the rights of the accused be read to him in a lan-
guage he understands and that he be cautioned in that language.
(C) When an arrest warrant issued by the Tribunal is executed, a
member of the Prosecutor’s Office may be present as from the time
of arrest.
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RULE 56
Co-operation of States
The State to which a warrant of arrest or a transfer order for a
witness is transmitted shall act promptly and with all due diligence to
ensure proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance with
Article 28 of the Statute.
RULE 58
National Extradition Provisions
The obligations laid down in Article 28 of the Statute shall pre-
vail over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the ac-
cused or of a witness to the Tribunal which may exist under the na-
tional law or extradition treaties of the State concerned.
RULE 59
Failure to Execute a Warrant or Transfer Order
(A) Where the State to which a warrant of arrest or transfer or-
der has been transmitted has been unable to execute the warrant, it
shall report forthwith its inability to the Registrar, and the reasons
therefore.
(B) If, within a reasonable time after the warrant of arrest or
transfer order has been transmitted to the State, no report is made on
action taken, this shall be deemed a failure to execute the warrant of
arrest or transfer order and the Tribunal, through the President, may
notify the Security Council accordingly.
RULE 60
Advertisement of Indictment
At the request of the Prosecutor, a form of advertisement shall
be transmitted by the Registrar to the national authorities of any
State or States in whose territory the Prosecutor has reason to believe
that the accused may be found, for publication in newspapers having
wide circulation in that territory, intimating to the accused that serv-
ice of an indictment against him is sought.
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RULE 61
Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant
(A) If, within a reasonable time, a warrant of arrest has not been
executed, and personal service of the indictment has consequently
not been effected, the Judge who confirmed the indictment shall in-
vite the Prosecutor to report on the measures he has taken. When the
Judge is satisfied that:
(i) the Prosecutor has taken all reasonable steps to effect personal
service, including recourse to the appropriate authorities of the
State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction and control the
person to be served resides or was last known to him to be; and
(ii) the Prosecutor has otherwise tried to inform the accused of the
existence of the indictment by seeking publication of newspaper
advertisements pursuant to Rule 60, the Judge shall order that the
indictment be submitted by the Prosecutor to his Trial Chamber.
(B) Upon obtaining such an order the Prosecutor shall submit
the indictment to the Trial Chamber in open court, together with all
the evidence that was before the Judge who initially confirmed the
indictment and any other evidence submitted to him after confirma-
tion of the indictment. The Prosecutor may also call before the Trial
Chamber and examine any witness whose statement has been submit-
ted to the confirming Judge.
(C) If the Trial Chamber is satisfied on that evidence, together
with such additional evidence as the Prosecutor may tender, that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has
committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall
so determine. The Trial Chamber shall have the relevant parts of the
indictment read out by the Prosecutor together with an account of
the efforts to effect service referred to in Sub-rule (A) above.
(D) The Trial Chamber shall also issue an international arrest
warrant in respect of the accused which shall be transmitted to all
States. Upon request by the Prosecutor or proprio motu, after having
heard the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber may order a State or States
to adopt provisional measures to freeze the assets of the accused,
without prejudice to the rights of third parties.
(E) If the Prosecutor satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure
to effect personal service was due in whole or in part to a failure or
refusal of a State to co-operate with the Tribunal in accordance with
Article 28 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber shall so certify. After
consulting the Presiding Judges of the Chambers, the President shall
notify the Security Council thereof in such manner as he thinks fit.
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RULE 74
Amicus Curiae
A Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper de-
termination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State, organisation
or person to appear before it and make submissions on any issue
specified by the Chamber.
RULE 88
Judgment
(A) The judgement shall be pronounced in public, on a date of
which notice shall have been given to the parties and counsel and at
which they shall be entitled to be present.
(B) If the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty of a crime and
concludes from the evidence that unlawful taking of property by the
accused was associated with it, it shall make a specific finding to that
effect in its judgement. The Trial Chamber may order restitution as
provided in Rule 105.
(C) The judgement shall be rendered by a majority of the
Judges. It shall be accompanied or followed as soon as possible by a




(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term up to and including the remainder of his life.
(B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take
into account the factors mentioned in Article 23(2) of the Statute, as
well as such factors as:
(i) any aggravating circumstances;
(ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial co-
operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or af-
ter conviction;
(iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of
Rwanda;
(iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any State
on the convicted person for the same act has already been served,
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as referred to in Article 9(3) of the Statute.
(C) The Trial Chamber shall indicate whether multiple sentences
shall be served consecutively or concurrently.
(D) The sentence shall be pronounced in public and in the pres-
ence of the convicted person, subject to Rule 102(B).
(E) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period,
if any, during which the convicted person was detained in custody
pending his surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal.
RULE 103
Place of Imprisonment
(A) Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any State desig-
nated by the Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated their
willingness to accept convicted persons. Prior to a decision on the
place of imprisonment, the Chamber shall notify the Government of
Rwanda.
(B) Transfer of the convicted person to that State shall be ef-
fected as soon as possible after the time-limit for appeal has elapsed.
RULE 104
Supervision of Imprisonment
All sentences of imprisonment shall be supervised by the Tribu-
nal or a body designated by it.
RULE 105
Restitution of Property
(A) After a judgement of conviction containing a specific finding
as provided in Rule 88(B), the Trial Chamber shall, at the request of
the Prosecutor, or may, at its own initiative, hold a special hearing to
determine the matter of the restitution of the property or the pro-
ceeds thereof, and may in the meantime order such provisional
measures for the preservation and protection of the property or pro-
ceeds as it considers appropriate.
(B) The determination may extend to such property or its pro-
ceeds, even in the hands of third parties not otherwise connected with
the crime of which the convicted person has been found guilty.
(C) Such third parties shall be summoned before the Trial
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Chamber and be given an opportunity to justify their claim to the
property or its proceeds.
(D) Should the Trial Chamber be able to determine the rightful
owner on the balance of probabilities, it shall order the restitution ei-
ther of the property or the proceeds or make such other order as it
may deem appropriate.
(E) Should the Trial Chamber not be able to determine owner-
ship, it shall notify the competent national authorities and request
them so to determine.
(F) Upon notice from the national authorities that an affirmative
determination has been made, the Trial Chamber shall order the res-
titution either of the property or the proceeds or make such other or-
der as it may deem appropriate.
(G) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent national
authorities any summonses, orders and requests issued by a Trial
Chamber pursuant to Sub-rules (C),(D),(E) and (F).
RULE 106
Compensation to Victims
(A) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of
the States concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty of a
crime which has caused injury to a victim.
(B) Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or per-
sons claiming through him may bring an action in a national court or
other competent body to obtain compensation.
(C) For the purposes of a claim made under Sub-rule (B) the
judgement of the Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the crimi-
nal responsibility of the convicted person for such injury.
